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1. RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES 
 
In the last 25 years the relationship among the intstitutions of the European Union (EU) as well 
as their roles and power in EU legislation have changed significantly. In this process, the treaties 
of the EU played the key role, out of which the two most imporant ones were the Treay of 
Maastricht and the Treaty of Lisbon. The first one entered into force in 1993 and introduced the 
co-decision procedure, while the latter one entered into force in 2009 and further extended the 
scope of co-decision to other policy areas. 
 
There is an array of literature - primarily in the domain of political science - dealing with the 
changing role of European Parliament (EP) in EU decision-making. Three research areas can 
be identified: one is examining the EP's relative weight in decision-making compared to the 
European Commission (EC) or the Council, while one of the others deals with the EP’s power 
and influence under different legislative procedures (Tsebelis and Kalandrakis, 1999; Kreppel, 
2002; Tsebelis et al., 2001; Lucic, 2004). The third one concentrates on the factors which 
influence the adoption of EP amendments (Kreppel, 1999; Shackelton, 1999; Kardasheva, 
2009). 
 
The legislative instruments of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for the 2014-2020 EU 
programming period have been adopted in 2013 after a long and complicated process, which 
also included fierce institutional and legal battles among the institutions. All the EU institutions 
took part in this legislative process: the European Commission, the Council of the European 
Union, the Council of Agricultural Ministers and the European Parliament. From the point of 
view of the EP, the key question of the 2013 CAP reform was whether the extension of the co-
decision procedure to the field of the CAP by the Treaty of Lisbon increased the influence of 
the EP in the decision-making process. 
 
Based on previous theoretical papers as well as the experiences of other EU policy domains 
falling under the co-decision procedure, a number of preliminary expectations have been 
defined regarding the prospective impact of the extension of the co-decision procedure on the 
legislation of the CAP. Three main points have been defined: 1) the change in the inter-
institutional relations; 2) the impact on decision-making (if the EP will be able to take a 
decision); 3) the impact on the final policy outcome of the CAP reform (Swinnen, 2015). This 
dissertation contributes to the first area by analysing the relationship between the EP and the 
Council. 
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Considering the relationships of EU institutions, preliminary expectations emphasised that the 
extension of the co-decision procedure could result in the decrease of the power of the European 
Commission as well as the empowerment of both the European Parliament and the Council 
(Crombez et al. (2012); Greer and Hind (2012)). Greer and Hind (2012) envisaged four possible 
scenarios for the new inter-institutional setting after the extension of the co-decision procedure 
to the EP. One of them is the so-called ’conventional’ scenario, which expects the growing 
power of the EP while the EC and the Council gradually loosing power (Swinnen, 2015). This 
dissertation is partly about the examination of this conventional scenario via analysing the 
relationship between the EP and the Council. 
 
This Ph.D. research is a case study, which examines the role of the European Parliament in two 
consecutive EU programming periods 2007-2013 and 2014-2020, regarding the legislation of 
the EU’s highest-budget common policy, the CAP. This research is based on a dataset of 
amendments tabled to the legislative proposals of the Common Agricultural Policy. In the 2007-
2013 EU programming period – before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon – the EP 
took part in the formulation of the CAP legislation under the consultation procedure. As for the 
2014-2020 period, the EP is already a co-legislator under the co-decision procedure. Therefore, 
the comparison between the two EU programming periods provides an opportunity for 
comparing the two legislative procudures in terms of the role of the European Parliament. 
 
The dataset of the research contains more than 8,000 legislative amendments. These 
amendments have been tabled to the same CAP legislative proposals of the two consecutive EU 
programming periods, 4 proposals in each. In the dataset, each amendment is described by 15 
variables. Most of these variables relate to the political role and personal characteristics of the 
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) as well as to their Member States (MSs). These 
variables have not been analysed in previous research yet. 
 
The overall objective of this research is to give a comprehensive picture on the legislative 
process of the EU through quantifiable and measureable indicators, so that we can better 
understand the role of the EP in the CAP legislation. Besides its overall objective, this research 
has three specific objectives. 
 
The first objective of the research is to compare the legislative influence of the European 
Parliament between the consultation and the co-decision procedures. The objective is to analyse 
whether the power and influence of the European Parliament increased after the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon in the domain of the CAP legislation. 
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The second objective of the research is to identify and test those factors which influence the 
adoption of the EP legislative amendments. The key objective here is to name those explanatory 
variables which influence the success of EP amendments in a statistically significant way. The 
related structural equation model (SEM) aims at identifying those groups of variables – factors 
–, which have an impact on the adoption of amendments at various levels of decision-making. 
 
Finally, the social network analysis (SNA) of the 2013 CAP reform has three objectives. First, 
to identify those EP Groups and Member States, which were the most active ones in tabling 
legislative amendments. Second, the analysis reveals the most frequent and most powerful 
relationships both between MSs and EP Groups. Finally, the social network analysis highlights 
what factors influence the cooperation between MEPs – both EP Groups and Member States – 
in the intra-EP network. 
 
It is important to emphasise that one of the objectives during the elaboration of the disseration 
was to apply novel methodologies for the evaluation of EU decision-making, which have not 
been applied in the context of EU legislation. 
 
The structure of the dissertation is as follows. The introduction is followed by the literature 
review, then I introduce the objectives and define the research questions and hypotheses. The 
description of the research methodology and the dataset is followed by the analysis, which is 
divided into three separate chapters. First, I present the analysis of the success rates of EP 
amendments. Second, I analyse the factors influencing the adoption of the EP amendments and 
I present the structural equations model. Finally, I present the social network analysis, which 
concentrates on the networks of MEPs. At the end of the dissertation I summarize and discuss 
the results. 
 
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The role and legislative influence of the European Parliament are analyzed from different point 
of views in line with the different methodologies applied in the research. The calculation of 
adoption rates of EP amendments in both of the legislative procedures and at various levels of 
the decision-making procedure, the analysis of factors influencing the adoption of EP 
amendments as well as the social network analysis of the MEPs tabling joint amendments all 
contribute to the objective of the research to get a fine-tuned picture on the role of the EP in the 
legislation of the 2013 CAP reform.  
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The simpliest way to measure the legislative influence of the European Parliament is to 
calculate the adoption rates of EP amendments and apply them as indicators for legislative 
power. Most of the articles analysing EP amendments apply success rates of amendments as 
indicators for legislative influence (Kreppel 1999; Tsebelis and Kalandrakis 1999; Kreppel 
2002; Tsebelis et al., 2001; Lucic 2004). The key research question is whether the legislative 
influence of the European Parliament is higher under the co-decision procedure compared to 
the consultation procedure. The objective of this analysis is to reinforce the conclusions of 
Tsebelis et al. (2001), Tsebelis and Garrett (2001), Hix (2002), Kreppel (2002), Selck and 
Steunenberg (2004) and Thomson et al. (2006) about the increasing power of the EP. Therefore, 
the hypothesis connected to this research question is as follows: 
 
H1. hypothesis: The European Parliament increased its legislative influence in the field of the 
Common Agricultural Policy with the extension of the co-decision procedure by the Treaty of 
Lisbon. 
 
In previous articles connected to the European Parliament, binary logistic regression has been 
applied to test and measure the impact of explanatory variables on the adoption of the legislative 
amendments (Kreppel, 1999; Lucic, 2004; Kardasheva, 2009; Burns et al., 2009). Their main 
conclusion was that both the type of the amendment and the characteristics of the decision-
making process influence the adoption of amendments. 
 
In the dissertation I present the SEM model connected to the logistic regression, given that both 
approach analyse the variables of the research, either observed or latent. 
 
Structural equation modelling is mostly used in social sciences – primarily in sociology, 
marketing and political science –, and also in psychology. In political science, it is used to 
describe voters’ behaviour and decisions as well as the factors influencing them. SEM is a type 
of confirmatory analysis, in which the relationships are specified prior to the analysis. Based 
on theory, experience and research objectives, the researcher preliminary defines which 
independent variables predict each dependent variable. 
 
With the analysis of the explanatory variables, the key question of the research is which 
variables or groups of variables influence the adoption of the EP legislative amendments in the 
field of the Common Agricultural Policy and how. Based on this, the relevant hypothesis is 
defined as follows: 
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H2. hypothesis: The characteristics of the amendment as well as the proposing MEP and his or 
her Member State have an impact on the adoption of EP amendments at each decision-making 
level of the EP in the field of the CAP. 
 
The third pillar of the reserach contains the analysis of the relationships and networks of the 
MEPs who participated in the legislative process.  
 
The term ‘network’ is frequently used to describe clusters of different kinds of actors who are 
linked together in political, social or economic life. Social network analysis is based on an 
assumption of the importance of relationships among interacting units. Relations defined by 
linkages among units are a fundamental component of network theories. Both statistical and 
descriptive uses of network analysis are distinct from more standard social science analysis and 
require concepts and analytic procedures that are different from traditional statistics 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994). 
 
The political networks embedded in the institutional-governmental system of the European 
Union were already subject to scientific analyses. Kaiser (2009) states that given its complex 
multilevel governance structures, the European Union is an obvious focus for studying policy 
networks. Peterson (2004) identified three key features that justify the use of policy network 
analysis for the EU’ multi-level governance. 
 
Regarding the European Parliament, Patz (2011) analysed the networks of the EP intergroups 
as well as the networks of EP Committees (Patz, 2012). One of his conclusions was that EP 
Groups – and their members – cluster together on the same political side more frequently. 
 
Stubb (1996) concluded that MEPs from EU-15 MSs form a relationship with each other more 
frequently than with MEPs from EU-12 MSs. Thurner and Binder (2009) states that established 
long-term economic and political relations may imply lower transactions and coordination 
costs. This statement reinforces the expectation that MEPs from Member States with closer 
geographical, historical, economic, political or linguistic connections form relationships more 
frequently in the legislative process.  
 
To date, research combining social network analysis with the analysis of the Common 
Agricultural Policy is very limited. Daugbjerg (1999) examined the network of the CAP and its 
influence on the outcome of the 1992 MacSharry reform. His main conclusion was that the 
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structure of policy networks influence policy reform outcomes. Peterson (2004) also analysed 
the policy network of the Common Agricultural Policy. He found that CAP legislation is mostly 
influenced by supranational networks. 
 
Based on the above literature, the third research question of this dissertation relates to the 
applicability of social network analysis in the context of CAP decision-making. The research 
aims at analysing what factors influence the cooperation of MEPs in the network. Therefore, 
the hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H3. hypothesis: When tabling amendments to CAP legislative instruments, the characteristics 
of MEPs and their Member States influence the cooperation and networks among them in the 
European Parliament. 
 
There are several novelties of this reserach. First and foremost, it is important to note that this 
research is the first one to compare the legislative influence of the European Parliament between 
the consultation and co-decision procedures in the Common Agricultural Policy via amendment 
analysis. Although Selck and Steunenberg (2004) compared these two legislative procedures 
with regards to the Treaty of Amsterdam, the transition from the consultation to the co-decision 
procedure in light of the Treaty of Lisbon has not been analysed yet. 
 
Another novel element in this dissertation is that when calculating amendment success rates, 
amendments have been categorised according to their characteristics and the internal decision-
making phase in which they were proposed. Based on this, five categories have been defined: 
draft report amendment, open amendments, compromise amendments, amendments tabled by 
opinion-giving committees and plenary amendments. Previous research only focused on one 
type of EP amendments: either plenary amendments (Yordanova, 2009) or open amendments 
(Tsebelis and Kalandrakis, 1999; Tsebelis et al., 2001), but the simultaneous analysis of various 
types of amendments during the legislative procedure of a policy domain has not been 
conducted yet. Additionally, during the 2013 CAP reform, I also created the categories of 
‘agricultural policy amendments’ and ‘CAP reform amendments’ to calculate success rates 
along these categories, which is also a novelty in CAP-related research. 
 
Unlike previous researches, this research apply MEP- and Member State-related explanatory 
variables in determining the factors influencing the adoption of EP amendments. Previous 
research tested a number of explanatory variables – type of amendment, internal EP unity, 
number of readings, recital amendment (Kreppel, 1999), rapporteur’s amendment (Tsebelis, 
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1995), but the testing of MEP and Member State-related variables is a new element in the 
context of both the CAP and the European Parliament.  
 
Another novel method in the dissertation is that both in calculating success rates and in case of 
the logistic regression, there are three dependent variables in line with the key stages of the EU 
legislative procedure: (1) adoption by the EP Committee in charge; (2) adoption by the EP 
plenary session; (3) adoption by the Council. While previous analysis only focused on one of 
these decision-making points, my approach enables to identify and compare the success rates 
and the significant explanatory variables at each of these three stages.  
 
Regarding the application of the SEM model, it can be stated that the political decision-making 
as well as the legislative processes of the European Union, including the European Parliament, 
have not been the subject of neither explorative nor confirmative factor analysis. Obviously, 
this is also true for analyses based on the legislative amendments – and the connected variables 
– of the European Parliament. 
 
The novelty of this type of research is that most of the confirmative factor models that were 
applied in political science analysed political participation or voting patterns – factors 
influencing the voting decision of voters – with the use of structural equations (Barbaranelli et 
al., 2007; de Vries–de Graaf–Eisinga, 2008; Leimgruber, 2011). Nevertheless, it has not been 
applied for analysing the EU’s legislative procedures. 
 
As for the social network analysis presented in the dissertation, to date, social network analysis 
has only been applied in the context of the European Parliament in order to see the relationships 
of EP committees (Patz 2011, 2012). Nevertheless, the network of MEPs – expressed in their 
party affiliation and nationality – has not been analysed yet. Besides, in the European 
parliamentary context, previous analyses concentrated on national and party coalitions in the 
EP, but these analyses were based on EP plenary voting results (CEPS-Votewatch, 2012; 
Votewatch, 2014). This research comes up with national and party coalitions embedded in the 
jointly tabled EP amendments, which have not been analysed yet.  
 
Previous articles analysing the networks of the CAP (Daugbjerg, 1999; Moschitz and Stolze, 
2009) investigated the consultation procedure, but this research investigates intra-EP political 
networks in light of the extension of the co-decision procedure to the CAP in 2009 by the Treaty 
of Lisbon. 
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Finally, social network analysing methods have been already applied in the field of the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (Mérand et al., 2011) or in a special segment of the CAP, 
i.e. organic farming (Moschitz and Stolze, 2009), but a comprehensive social network analysis 
of the CAP hasn’t been subject of analysis yet. 
 
3. RESEARCH RESULTS 
 
One of the key results of the research presented in the dissertation is that is gives a quantified 
answer to a number of EP and CAP-related research questions based on a newly elaborated 
dataset. Based on previous related literature, preliminary expectations and on my own personal 
experiences, I defined three main research questions and hypotheses. In this chapter, I present 
the results of the research along these hypotheses. 
 
Results of the amendment success rates 
 
Regarding the H1. hypothesis, which says that the EP managed to increase its legislative 
influence under the codecision procedure, I tested the hypothesis by calculating and comparing 
the adoption rates of EP amendments under both the consultation and co-decision procedure.  
 
The main conclusion of our analysis is that the rates of adoption of EP amendments is higher 
under the co-decision procedure compared to the consultation procedure along all the observed 
amendment categories. Based on this we can firmly state that the European Parliament 
increased its legislative influence in the field of CAP after the Treaty of Lisbon. Therefore, we 
confirm the H1. hypothesis of this research. 
 
In general, these results confirm the findings by Corbett et al. (1995) and Tsebelis et al. (2001) 
that the adoption rates of Parliament amendments are higher under the co-decision procedure. 
The results also confirm the conclusions of Hix (2002), Kreppel (2002), Thomson et al. (2006) 
and Jupille (2007) that the EP could increase its legislative influence under the co-decision 
procedure.  
 
The results are also in line with the findings of Crombez & Swinnen (2011) on the CAP reform, 
namely that the Parliament gains legislative influence in the move from consultation to co-
decision procedure. The results also support the conclusions of Roederer-Rynning and 
Schimmelfennig (2012) that the Treaty of Lisbon increased the influence of the Parliament in 
legislative terms in the CAP. 
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One of the key findings of this research is that in the legislative process of the 2013 CAP reform, 
more than 50% of the agricultural policy amendments in the Parliament negotiation mandate 
were incorporated in the final regulations, which appears to make the Parliament an equal 
partner with the Council during the trilogue negotiations. In general, this result reinforces the 
positions of Crombez (1997), Tsebelis and Garrett (2001) as well as Selck and Steunenberg 
(2004) that the Parliament became a real co-legislator with the Council after the introduction of 
the co-decision procedure. 
 
It is noteworthy to mention two new results of the research here, one of them is connected to 
the role of the rapporteur MEPs, while the other one is related to the opinion-giving committees. 
First, the adoption rates of compromise amendments was the highest out of all amendment 
categories. The high success rates of both compromise and draft report amendments show the 
key role of the rapporteurs and their significant legisaltive influence. On the other hand, the 
adoption rates of amendments tabled by opinion-giving committees were the lowest, 
highlighting their limited and marginal role in the legislative process. 
 
Results of the logistic regression and the SEM model 
 
The second hypothesis of the research states that the type of amendment as well as the 
characteristics of the MEPs tabling the amendments have an impact on their adoption. We can 
draw the following conclusions after the analysis. 
 
The results of the binary logistic regression show that there are a number of significant 
explanatory variables at all three levels of the decision-making under both legislative 
procedures. These variables have an impact on the adoption of the EP amendments: the positive 
classification of some of them increases, while the positive classification of others decreases 
the odds of adoption of the amendment. We can conclude that the existence of significant 
variables confirm the H2. hypothesis. 
 
The logistic regression identified the following significant explanatory variables. Out of the 
amendment-related variables, the Compromise amendment and Draft report amendment 
variables were significant under both the consultation and the co-decision procedures in most 
of the three decision-making levels. The positive classification of the variables increased the 
odds of adoption. Additionally, in the co-decision procedure, the Recital amendment variable 
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was also significant at the intra-EP decision-making levels: its positive classification also 
increased the odds of adoption. This latter result confirms the conclusions of Kreppel (1999). 
 
Regarding the variables attached to the MEPs, under the consultation procedure some of them 
– for example, European People’s Party (EPP) of the liberal EP Group – were significant. Under 
the co-decision procedure, besides the EPP variable, also the Member and Substitute Member 
of COMAGRI variables were significant. In case of all these variables, the positive 
classification increased the odds of adoption. The results regarding the EP Groups confirm the 
conclusions of Hix et al. (2005) and Yordanova (2009).  
 
As for the variables connected to the Member States of MEPs, under the consultation procedure 
the EU-15 Member States and the Agricultural Member States variables were significant. Their 
positive classification increased the odds of adoption. However, under the co-decision 
procedure, there were four significant Member State related variables: Net contributor MS, EU-
15 MS, Cohesion MS, Constituency. Their positive classification had varied impact on the odds 
of adoption of amendments at the different decision-making levels. 
 
Besides analyzing the impact of explanatory variables with logistic regression, I also developed 
a structural equation model to test the impact of five groups of variables – so-called latent 
variables – on the adoption of amendments. Given the generally weak fit of the model, the 
conclusions regarding the impact of latent variables shall be treated and interpreted with 
reservations.  
 
The results confirm that legal and institutional factors have an impact on the adoption of EP 
amendments in COMAGRI. This confirms the findings of Tsebelis–Kalandrakis (1999), 
Tsebelis et al. (2001), Lucic (2004) and Kardasheva (2009). 
 
The results of the model show that factors connected to the Member State of the MEP have an 
impact on the adoption of EP amendments both at EP plenary and in the Council. The results 
confirm the results of Sigalas (2010) and Kovács (2014). We can also conclude that Member 
State related factors have higher impact on the adoption of amendments by the Council. 
 
It can be also concluded that amendment-related factors have an impact on the adoption of the 
amendments in the COMAGRI. This result confirms the conclusions of Shackleton (1999) and 
Kreppel (1999). 
 
14 
 
Finally, based on the results of the SEM model we can conclude that political factors have an 
impact on the adoption of EP amendments at all three levels of the decision-making. It is 
important to note that political factors have the highest impact on the decison-making in the 
Council, which shows the significant influence of MEPs whose political affilition is the same 
with that of their respective national governments. These results confirm the conclusions of 
Kreppel (1999) and Kardasheva (2009). 
 
Results of the Social Network Analysis 
 
According to the third hypothesis of the research, the characteristics of the MEPs as well as 
their Member States influence the cooperation of MEPs when tabling amendments to the CAP 
legislative proposals and also the evolution of networks among them.  
 
A general but imporant conclusion of the social network analysis is that the role of the EP in 
EU legislation can be analysed with SNA methods and these results can be interpreted in real 
life environment. The results make it possible to get a better insight into the role of EP in EU-
level decision-making, and how this role is influenced by the nationality and party affiliation 
of the MEPs. 
 
The analysis identified several factors both regarding the MEPs and their MSs, which influence 
the cooperation of among MEPs in the European Parliament. Therefore, we confirm the H3. 
hypothesis. 
 
The outcomes of the research contributed to the existing literature several ways. First, the 
outcomes of the analysis of the network of Member States confirmed the conclusions of Thurner 
and Binder (2009) that net contributor Member States establish relationship with each other 
more frequently. The results of this analysis also confirmed that MEPs from EU-15 Member 
States form relationships with each other more frequently than with their counterparts from EU-
12 Member States. This supports the concept of Stubb (1996) and Thurner and Binder (2009). 
Regarding the network of Member States, the results are also in line with the conclusions of 
Thurner and Binder (2009) as MEPs from Member States with higher bilateral economic 
interdependency tie with each other more frequently. However, contrary to the hypothesis, the 
research outcomes did not confirm that MEPs from EU Member States which are 
geographically closer to each other would cooperate with each other more frequently in tabling 
amendments. Finally, the results confirm that ideological differences between MEPs – more 
precisely between EP Groups – are less a fragmenting factor, which impedes cooperation: 
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MEPs tie with each other more likely along ideological lines. It supports the conclusions of 
CEPS-Votewatch (2012) and is also partly in line with the statements of Mérand et al. (2011). 
 
Theoretical and practical relevance of the research 
 
The research presented in the dissertation contributes significantly to the extension of existing 
theories and research methods both regarding research on the European Parliament in general 
as well as research connected to the analysis of the Common Agricultural Policy. This research 
has the most scientific added value concerning the analysis of the co-decision procedure, the 
analysis of the amendment and MEP-related explanatory variables as well as the application of 
the SNA methodolgy in the context of the EP legislation. 
 
As for the practical relevance and applicability of the research, the outcomes of this dissertation 
are the most valueable for those aimed at analysing or even influencing EU decision-making. 
Umbrella and interest-representing organizations as well as stakeholders in the agri-food 
industry could capitalise on the results and the methodology presented in the dissertation. This 
latter one could help them identify the key players of the decision-making as well as the 
relationships among them, which helps carry out a deeper analysis compared to currently 
applied methodologies.  
 
Limitations and areas for future research 
 
Regarding the limitations of the research, it important to emphasise two factors. First, the 
amendments analysed in this research haven’t been categoried or weighted according to their 
importance. It naturally causes distortions in the calculations of adoption rates: it can happen 
that the adoption of less important amendments increases the success rates, although there is 
not real political success behind it. Second, given that this research is a case study in the field 
of the Common Agricultural Policy, it also means that at this moment, it is not possible to 
compare the results of this dissertation with results of similar research in other EU policy 
domains. Therefore, when interpreting the results of this dissertation, especially that of 
concerning the impact of co-decision on the European Parliament, we have to treat them with 
reservations.  
 
Concerning the future directions of research, when measuring the change in the legislative 
influence of the EP after the extension of the co-decision procedure to the CAP, it would be 
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advisable to analyse also the content of amendments and to take into account the different 
weighting of amendments in line with their policy importance.  
 
It is also important to mention that although the comparison between the two legislative 
procedures shows the growing influence of the European Parliament – which is most likely 
attributable to the extension of the co-decision procedure –, theoretically it is possible that the 
increased power of the EP is not the result of the Treaty of Lisbon but other factors, which have 
not been analysed in the framework of the dissertation. Further research could clarify this issue 
via the comparison of the results of this dissertation with the influence of the EP in the field of 
other EU policy domains falling under the 2014-2020 legislative package, like the Common 
Fisheries Policy or the Cohesion Policy. 
 
Finally, the social network analysis presented in the dissertation may be further elaborated in 
the future with the analysis of relationships embodied in the adopted EP amendments through 
which it will be possible to analyse the "winning" networks and to compare it with the networks 
described in this study. In addition, the analysis may also be extended to other policy areas in 
respect of which the European Parliament tables amendments to the legislative proposals of the 
European Commission. This would further allow a comparison of EP networks that exist in the 
various policy areas of the EU. 
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